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ABSTRACT
Modern forensics is a science that has been dynamically developing in recent years, which is 
related both to the general development of science and technology and to the needs of the judiciary 
and law enforcement agencies. The main feature of forensics is its interdisciplinarity. All the facts 
presented cause that the identity of modern forensics is changing. It is, in a way, a natural process. 
However, it poses a great danger of disintegrating this science. The article presents a discussion 
on the constantly changing paradigm of forensics, its goals and tasks. Such important theoretical 
issues have a large impact on forensic practice, primarily on expert opinions, teaching forensics and 
knowledge of forensics by lawyers.
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INTRODUCTION
Modern forensics is a science that has been dynamically developing in recent 
years, which is related both to the general development of science and technology 
and to the needs of the judiciary and law enforcement agencies. The development 
of forensics thus provokes a lively discussion about the paradigm of this science.1 
By the paradigm of science, we most often understand its essence (basis), what 
distinguishes a given science from other sciences. Sometimes the paradigm is 
understood as the identity of science. Within this identity, we can distinguish the 
scope of a given science, its goals and tasks, subject of interest, structure and 
methodological issues.2 The main feature of forensics is its interdisciplinarity. It 
does not fall within the traditional division of sciences into a priori and a posteriori 
sciences.3 On the one hand, in forensics, the methods of logic and mathematics 
are used, and thus the methods of a priori sciences – these methods occur in the 
problems of the theory of forensics, including in the theory of ideas and opinions, 
a number of investigative conclusions are also of this nature, On the other hand, the 
methods of a posteriori sciences are widely used – natural and technical sciences 
(broadly understood) and humanities. Forensics to a large extent uses the specific 
achievements of other sciences, creatively adapting them, at the same time, maybe 
apart from physics, no science has so many general laws in its output.4
The issues raised may be considered commonly known and the question may 
arise as to why we are returning to them now, why it is worth discussing them. Con-
nections of forensics with the current social development (and with the pathology 
accompanying this development, which is a modern crime), with the unprecedented 
in the history of mankind development of communication methods (especially infor-
mation exchange methods), the development of science and technology mean that 
forensics must develop as quickly. Forensics is purposeful science, legal science, 
science primarily aimed at the implementation of the norms of procedural criminal 
law, and thus at the implementation of the norms of substantive criminal law.5 If 
1 J. Kasprzak, Problem tożsamości współczesnej kryminalistyki, [in:] Współczesna kryminalistyka. 
Wyzwania i zagrożenia, eds. V. Kwiatkowska-Wójcikiewicz, M. Zubańska, Szczytno 2015, p. 7.
2 Cf. Podstawy filozofii, eds. S. Opara, A. Kucnera, B. Zielewska-Rudnicka, Olsztyn 2009, 
p. 162 ff.; R. Wójcicki, Wykłady z metodologii nauk, Warszawa 1982, p. 9 ff.; S. Pabis, Metodologia 
i metody nauk empirycznych, Warszawa 1985, pp. 12–13; A. Grobler, Metodologia nauk, Kraków 
2006, p. 251.
3 Podstawy filozofii…, p. 163.
4 B. Hołyst, Kryminalistyka, Warszawa 2010, p. 43. Cf. Kryminalistyka, ed. J. Widacki, War-
szawa 2008, p. 3 ff.; E. Gruza, M. Goc, J. Moszczyński, Kryminalistyka, czyli rzecz o metodach śled-
czych, Warszawa 2008, p. 20 ff.; iidem, Kryminalistyka, czyli o współczesnych metodach dowodzenia 
przestępstw, Warszawa 2020.
5 J. Kasprzak, B. Młodziejowski, W. Brzęk, J. Moszczyński, Kryminalistyka, Warszawa 2006, 
pp. 37–38.
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the substantive criminal law, and to a lesser extent the procedural criminal law, can 
allow for certain inertia, delayed action, then forensics cannot allow such a situation 
in any case. However, there is dissonance. Technical research methods, investigative 
methods, applied practically, began to precede theoretical assumptions. In recent 
years, the boundaries of the scope of forensics have started to “blur”, have become 
less clear. H. Kołecki draws attention to this phenomenon very accurately: “[…] after 
almost 45 years of dealing with university forensics, I see its subject and scope less 
and less clearly. As I read national forensic publications, it becomes more and more 
difficult for me to clearly determine what is and what is not forensics (the science of 
forensics)”.6 In this respect, Poland is not alone. The change in the identity of foren-
sics and the change in its paradigm was influenced by political changes in Europe 
at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, generating also negative phenomena in the 
form of rapid development of crime (especially organized crime) after the collapse 
of many functions of the state in the former countries of the socialist camp, and the 
rapid development of science and techniques (especially information technology and 
global communication). Fundamental changes in forensics took place in Germany and 
other Western European countries,7 in Russia – where in the 2001 Code of Criminal 
Procedure of the Russian Federation the principle of substantive truth was replaced 
by the principle of judicial truth.8 On the other hand, the evaluation of evidence, es-
pecially scientific evidence in the form of an expert opinion in Poland, is increasingly 
influenced by the American principles resulting from the Daubert standard, discussion 
of American court judgements and views resulting from American scientific studies.9
All the facts presented cause that the identity of modern forensics is changing. 
It is, in a way, a natural process. However, it poses a great danger of disintegrating 
this science. For how attractive it seems for a scientist to create a “new branch of 
science”, to challenge traditionally binding dogmas. Such an action is justified when 
the previous statements are replaced by new statements – tested and justified in ac-
cordance with the assumptions of falsification.10 However, when there is a negation 
of the existing dogmas, without indicating new alternative solutions, on the basis of 
only “sticking the proverbial stick into the anthill”, then such an action should be 
6 H. Kołecki, Zakres i sposób uprawiania kryminalistyki w Polsce, [in:] idem, Kryminalistyka 
i nauki penalne wobec przestępczości, Poznań 2008, p. 397.
7 Cf. P. Girdwoyń, Opinia biegłego w sprawach karnych w europejskim systemie prawnym. 
Perspektywy harmonizacji, Warszawa 2011; B. Hołyst, “Kryminalistyka na Świecie” 2014, no. 1(4), 
pp. 41–42.
8 D. Sołodow, Ocena dowodów naukowych w systemie kryminalistyki rosyjskiej, Olsztyn–Szcze-
cin 2012, p. 84.
9 Ibidem, p. 160 ff. Cf. J. Wójcikiewicz, Temida nad mikroskopem. Judykatura wobec dowodu 
naukowego, Toruń 2009; J. Konieczny, Kryzys czy zmiana paradygmatu kryminalistyki?, “Państwo 
i Prawo” 2012, no. 1.
10 Cf. K.R. Popper, Logika odkrycia naukowego, Warszawa 2002, pp. 74–75.
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assessed negatively, because it may undermine the trust among the litigants and the 
court in the commonly used and scientifically falsified methods of scientific evidence. 
After all, we are in a real fashion to “Americanize” our law and forensics. When we 
adopt institutions that work well in our legal system – for example, institutions of 
a crown witness, police provocation, new activities in the field of operational and 
reconnaissance work, research technology in some types of expertise – such activities 
should be assessed positively. However, when the issues of “unscientific” scientific 
methods used in Poland for a long time reach our ground, this “Americanization” 
becomes debatable.11 These studies are often the result of judgements by US state and 
federal courts. The dissimilarity of the law, rules of evidence, complete detachment 
from the context of the realities and tradition of Polish and European forensics make 
these American solutions, perhaps interesting in terms of cognition, of little use in 
our practice. It should also be emphasized that European forensics (including Polish 
forensics) is completely unknown to American authors. The issues raised have been 
well researched, developed and put into practice in Europe for many years.12
FORMS OF UNDERSTANDING FORENSICS
Due to its complexity and multidimensionality, the identity of forensics (as well 
as the identity of science in general) can be considered in seven aspects (planes):13
1. Forensics as a species of knowledge – scientific knowledge.
2. Forensics as a practice aimed at the implementation of legal norms, espe-
cially in the field of procedural and substantive criminal law.
3. Forensics as a science that develops specific research methods concerning 
both science and practice, especially in the field of forensic tactics and 
techniques.
4. Forensics as a subject of didactics.
5. A team of scientific and research institutions dealing with forensics.
6. Forensics as a form of social awareness and the problem of knowledge of 
forensics among lawyers.
7. Forensics as an element of modern science in the system of productive forces 
of modern society.
11 A. Feluś, O tzw. nienaukowości ekspertyzy pisma ręcznego, [in:] Doctrina multiplex veritas 
una. Księga Jubileuszowa ofiarowana Profesorowi Mariuszowi Kulickiemu, Twórcy Katedry Krymina-
listyki, z okazji 35-lecia powołania Katedry na Wydziale Prawa i Administracji UMK, eds. A. Bulsie-
wicz, A. Marek, V. Kwiatkowska-Darul, Toruń 2004, p. 73; T. Widła, Ekspertyza pismoznawcza jako 
dowód naukowy, [in:] Nauka wobec przestępczości, eds. J. Błachut, M. Szewczyk, J. Wójcikiewicz, 
Kraków 2001, p. 99 ff.
12 Cf. H. Tuthill, Individualization: Principles and Procedures in Criminalistics, Salem 1994.
13 Cf. J. Such, M. Szcześniak, Filozofia nauki, Poznań 1999, p. 10.
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A detailed discussion of all the above-mentioned planes influencing the identity 
of forensics would require extensive elaboration and exceed the scope of this article. 
Also, many issues are so obvious that they do not cause discussion at all. For these 
reasons, reference will only be made to some issues, subjectively considered by 
the authors to be the most important or controversial.
FORENSICS AS A KIND OF KNOWLEDGE
Forensics is scientific knowledge. The year 1893 and the publication of the first 
edition of H. Gross’ fundamental work are commonly regarded as the date of the 
founding of scientific forensics. Forensics is so science relatively young, its ori-
gins date back to the 19th century. Although the actions of law enforcement efforts 
to detect and apprehend the perpetrators of the crime and to prove his guilt, were 
taken from the period in which there was a crime as a social phenomenon, related 
to the state and existing there is a social system in it, but the modern organization 
and methodology of these activities could not be discussed until the 19th centu-
ry. Earlier, in the entire world criminal trial, there was a far-reaching formalism, 
often based on irrational premises, for example, faith in the help of supernatural 
forces – in the “judgements of God”. Most of the efforts of the law enforcement 
agencies were to obtain a confession of the suspect. Confessions, most often forced 
by torture. However, despite the primitive, as understood today, methods of in-
vestigation of that time, it can be stated that the origins of scientific evidence date 
back to antiquity. They concern knowledge in the field of forensics, construction 
and craftsmanship as well as examination of the authenticity of documents. The 
second half of the 18th century and the 19th century is the period of revolutionary 
changes in criminal law and the criminal trial. The inquisitive form of the trial was 
displaced by the mixed form, the legal theory of evidence by the principle of the 
free evaluation of evidence.14
The 18th and 19th centuries also saw the rapid development of the bourgeoisie 
and the growing wealth of this class, on the other hand, the impoverishment and 
ruin of the peasantry. It resulted in a great influx of people to the cities and an in-
crease in numbers and the poor. Therefore, mainly, on the basis of socio-economic 
changes, we can look for the etiological premises of the increase in crime in this 
period. So a search for new forms of the criminal trial began. The need to establish 
an organized body to deal with the detection of offenders and their prosecution, i.e. 
a modern police force, was also realized.
14 J. Kasprzak, B. Młodziejowski, W. Brzęk, J. Moszczyński, op. cit., p. 18. Cf. B. Sygit, Historia 
prawa kryminalnego, Toruń 2007.
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The 19th century is also a century of rapid development of technology, med-
icine, biology and chemistry. All the latest achievements of these sciences were 
quickly implemented in the fight against crime. We should mention here the Ber-
tillon methods, as well as a fingerprint identification method. During this period, 
theoretical works began to appear. This is the situation in which H. Gross’ work 
appears. The 20th century is characterized by the further development of forensics. 
The achievements of many sciences are used in the fight criminal activities, but 
forensics is precisely the field of knowledge that does not mechanically follow 
research methods developed by other sciences, but creatively adapts them for its 
own purposes.15 For example, we can mention the examination of invisible traces 
in ultraviolet or infrared rays, spectrography, X-ray, etc. Moreover, forensics de-
velops its own methods (e.g. dactyloscopy, psychological principles of collecting 
and assessing personal evidence, etc.) and initiates research to use the results of 
various sciences to increase the efficiency of criminal prosecution.
The concept, subject and role of forensics have changed along with its devel-
opment. Anyway, also today forensics is not clearly defined, which best proves the 
ongoing progress in this science and its complexity.
H. Gross assumed that forensics is an element of natural science in criminal 
law, and the subject of its research are the realities of criminal law in the broadest 
sense of the word. A similar position was taken by the co-founder of the criminal 
scientist E. Locard, according to whom forensics combines various sciences into 
the study of the techniques of crime.16 This real evidence was to replace the ex-
tortion of confessions with the torture used so far. Therefore, in the initial stage of 
forensics development, its role was limited to examining the technical aspects of 
crime. This does not mean, however, that procedural activities such as interrogations 
of suspects and witnesses were abandoned, but the enthusiasm of the creators of 
forensics, resulting from the success of using technical means of evidence, meant 
that the role of personal evidence sources was diminished.17
This trend remained not long. Despite the continuous development of forensic 
science technique, in the second half of the 20th century, the views that forensics also 
included tactics, directed both at the perpetrator’s and law enforcement’s actions, 
began to prevail. P. Horoszowski – in his textbook Criminalistics published in 1958 
– defined forensics as follows: “[…] this science examines the methods and means of 
committing crimes and develops methods for detecting a crime or for identifying and 
capturing the perpetrator of criminal act. […] certain procedures and specific technical 
measures are applied in the case of criminal activity, as well as in the detection of 
15 J. Kasprzak, B. Młodziejowski, W. Brzęk, J. Moszczyński, op. cit., p. 20.
16 Ibidem, p. 30.
17 Cf. E. Locard, Dochodzenie przestępstw według metod naukowych, Łódź 1937, p. 13.
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crimes and the prosecution of perpetrators. Therefore, one can conceptually distin-
guish two, strictly indefinite areas of forensics: criminal tactics and techniques”.18
The next step in extending the scope of forensics was to relate it not only to law 
enforcement but also to crime prevention. Such a position was presented, among 
others, by B. Hołyst, who wrote in 1973 that “forensics is the study of methods of 
establishing the fact of a crime, how it was committed, detecting perpetrators and 
preventing crimes”.19
M. Kulicki perceives the scope of criminology very broadly, according to which 
“forensics is a science that enters the system of legal sciences, because it arises from 
the needs of law and serves its implementation. Forensics […] serves the imple-
mentation of the norms of substantive criminal law, mainly by establishing many 
aspects of the subject and the perpetrator. Forensics also fills many dispositions of 
procedural law norms with praxeological content […]. The principles of forensics 
should also be applied in a civil trial […], as well as in proceedings relating to 
misdemeanors. Forensics is a science that covers not only the pre-indictment pro-
ceedings, but also the jurisdictional stage of a trial. The subject of forensic research 
and concepts are both procedural (evidence) and extra-procedural (operational and 
reconnaissance) activities. The subject of forensic research are criminal tactics and 
techniques, as well as forensic tactics and techniques (reconnaissance, detection, 
evidence, preventive). Tactical and technical elements largely interpenetrate and 
pay off each other. […] The method of scientific research in forensics is the inte-
grative application of the achievements of a number of other sciences […] and the 
development of one’s own methods and means”.20
Also Z. Czeczot and T. Tomaszewski define forensics as a science practical, 
efficient operation that develops the principle, the use of technical and laboratory 
research methods in order to prevent the commission of crimes and their detection 
and determination of the facts, relevant evidence in criminal proceedings (prepa-
ratory and judicial dimensions ) or other (e.g. civil).21
In addition to tactics and techniques, T. Hanausek also distinguishes strategy, 
defining forensics as the science of tactical principles and methods as well as techni-
cal methods and means of identifying and detecting legally defined, negative social 
phenomena, in particular crimes and their perpetrators, and proving the existence 
or lack of a relationship between persons and events, as well as preventing crimes 
and other unfavorable but legally relevant phenomena. This science also deals with 
18 P. Horoszowski, Kryminalistyka, Warszawa 1958, pp. 13–14.
19 B. Hołyst, Kryminalistyka, Warszawa 1973, p. 21.
20 M. Kulicki, Kryminalistyka. Zagadnienia wybrane, Toruń 1990, pp. 46–47.
21 Z. Czeczot, T. Tomaszewski, Kryminalistyka ogólna, Toruń 1996, p. 16.
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the strategy of predicting and future recognition and combating these phenomena, 
especially by preventing their occurrence and development.22
An interesting point of view on forensics is presented by J. Widacki, who writes 
that, in academic terms, forensics as one of the subjects of legal studies, and at the 
same time the subject of research activities of university employees or departments of 
forensics, covers the general theory of investigation science, criminal tactics (includ-
ing both investigative and operational and reconnaissance activities), and all identi-
fication departments that were not included in other specialized and developed into 
separate scientific disciplines departments of knowledge, such as forensic medicine 
(now also a complex of disciplines), forensic toxicology, forensic chemistry, etc.23
Therefore, it can be concluded that forensics is a practical science, used in legal 
procedures, covering the technique, tactics and strategy of combating crime and 
other socially unfavorable phenomena. Forensics deals with learning the methods 
of committing crimes, detecting the fact of committing them and detecting perpe-
trators as well as methods of crime prevention.24
As can be seen from the above-mentioned definitions of forensics, this science 
is constantly expanding, its scope is expanding, which changes the identity and 
paradigm of this science. 
FORENSICS AS A PRACTICE
Forensics as a practice aimed at the implementation of legal norms, especially 
in the field of procedural and substantive criminal law. In the preface to the third 
edition of his work, H. Gross wrote: “Forensics – in accordance with its nature – 
should enter where criminal law – also in accordance with its nature – can teach 
nothing more. […] Substantive criminal law defines crimes and penalties for them, 
procedural criminal law – rules to be followed when prosecuting crimes, and the 
questions: how are crimes committed, how is it investigated and established that 
the crime was committed […] cannot be answered by substantive criminal law or 
the provisions of criminal procedure”.25
The links between forensics and criminal law, and in particular with procedural 
law, result from the fact that forensics is a factor necessary to achieve the objectives 
of criminal legislation. However, while in the criminal trial attention is paid to 
guaranteeing civil rights and ensuring the optimal degree of objectivity within the 
22 T. Hanausek, Kryminalistyka. Zarys wykładu, Kraków 1996, p. 14 ff.
23 Kryminalistyka, ed. J. Widacki, p. 4.
24 J. Kasprzak, B. Młodziejowski, W. Brzęk, J. Moszczyński, op. cit., p. 32.
25 H. Gross, Rukowodstwo dlia sudiebnych sliedowatieliej kak sistiema kriminalistiki, Petersburg 
1908, p. VII. Cf. idem, Podręcznik dla sędziego śledczego jako system kryminalistyki, Warszawa 2021.
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established forms of evidence, forensics deals with the ways of achieving the gen-
eral objectives of the Code of Criminal Procedure by obtaining evidence, securing 
it and presenting it in a manner prescribed by law.26 The role of modern forensics 
does not end with investigative activities as part of preparatory proceedings. It 
blends into the whole of criminal proceedings – also at the jurisdictional stage.27 It 
is often impossible to separate procedural issues from their actual implementation 
with the use of forensic knowledge. In the same area of social reality, dogmatic 
legal sciences – the subject of which is to formulate statements about applicable 
law, using its own, very specific method – meet with forensics belonging to applied 
sciences, and the methods of natural research are one of the distinguishing fea-
tures of this discipline.28 In the modern world, where crime, unfortunately, enters 
every area of social life, the constant development of forensics, adaptation of the 
achievements of other sciences and their adaptation for use in the criminal process 
is a necessity. Thus, forensics becomes a hybrid science, in a sense, uniting legal 
and empirical issues. Who, if not a lawyer, can better sense the need to engage the 
achievements of technical and natural sciences in the detection and judicial process?
Despite this location of forensics within the criminal process, there are still views 
that reduce it to the level of police knowledge only. The fact that forensics is only an 
auxiliary science to the criminal process and functions to a large extent within it does 
not in any way detract from its role and importance. On the other hand, in the field of 
forensics, new fields are developed, each year brings us new research opportunities. 
Sometimes they are debatable from the point of view of the criminal trial, on the verge 
of prohibitions in evidence. The development of various areas and their impact on the 
sphere of the criminal process, protection of basic superior values and protection of 
the rights of the individual in the trial, as well as the fear of violating the rule of law 
are factors that mean that any possibility of using a new technical measure or a new 
method must be examined each time in terms of its legal admissibility.29
FORENSIC AS A SCIENCE
Forensics as a science develops specific research methods concerning both 
science and practice, especially in the field of forensic tactics and techniques. This 
issue is extremely extensive and the framework of this study does not allow for 
26 B. Hołyst, Kryminalistyka, Warszawa 2010, p. 53.
27 M. Kulicki, Kryminalistyka. Wybrane zagadnienia teorii i praktyki śledczo-sądowej, Toruń 
1994, pp. 29–30.
28 S. Waltoś, O związku prawa karnego procesowego z kryminalistyką, [in:] Nauka wobec 
przestępczości, eds. J. Błachut, M. Szewczyk, J. Wójcikiewicz, Kraków 2001, p. 178.
29 Idem, Proces karny. Zarys systemu, Warszawa 2002, p. 15.
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a complete discussion of this issue. Let us consider only two issues selectively. 
The problem of applying the Daubert standard to assess the evidential value of the 
applied research method by an expert in Polish forensic practice and the problem 
of issuing categorical opinions.
 One of the more complex and long-established criteria are the criteria of evidence 
in the American trial.30 They stem from a fear of overly hasty introduction of modern 
scientific evidence that may not be fully validated, contain errors, and cause wrongful 
convictions. These criteria cover a very wide range of issues, ranging from the cred-
ibility of a given scientific principle and the test method based on it, through the test 
procedure and equipment used, to the qualification of an expert.31 The admissibility 
of scientific evidence – evidence from an expert opinion as to its essence – is decided 
by the trial judge. In the United States, there are two admissibility tests: the older 
universal acceptance test from 1923 called the Frye test and the Daubert standard 
from 1993.32 The Frye test is based on the assumption that acceptance of a given type 
of evidence requires the acceptance of the scientific community in a given field. In 
the Daubert standard, the proof should meet certain criteria:
1. Is the theory, method, technique proposed by the expert verifiable?
2. Has it been checked?
3. Has it been the subject of scientific evaluation and publication in professional 
literature?
4. Is the potential error rate known in the method or technique used?
5. Are there standards for the use of this technique?
6. Is the methodology used universally accepted?33
Unlike the Anglo-American system, based on common law and the system of 
evidence rules, in a continental criminal trial, the model of which is in force in Po-
land, the principle of free evaluation of evidence is common (Article 7 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure). It is believed that the Code of Criminal Procedure should 
not be closed to scientific and technical progress, creating new evidence possibilities 
in the field of the so-called scientific evidence.34 According to S. Waltoś, the use 
of new research means and techniques in a criminal trial requires great caution. 
There are two dangers: the use of a research agent or technique that has not yet 
been tested, and the violation of fundamental human rights by new achievements 
in science and technology.35 Science must not be developed at the expense of the 
accused, a criminal trial is not a place to test scientific hypotheses.36
30 R. Tokarczyk, Prawo amerykańskie, Kraków 2000, p. 250 ff.
31 T. Tomaszewski., Proces amerykański. Problematyka śledcza, Toruń 1996, pp. 224–225.
32 C. Henderson, Expert Witness, [in:] Encyclopedia of Forensic Science, London 2000, p. 724.
33 Cf. T. Tomaszewski, op. cit., pp. 233–237.
34 R. Kmiecik, E. Skrętowicz, Proces karny – część ogólna, Kraków 2002, p. 367.
35 S. Waltoś, Proces karny. Zarys systemu, Warszawa 2009, pp. 347–348.
36 Ibidem, p. 347.
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In the jurisprudence of the Polish Supreme Court, there are no general criteria 
for scientific evidence and its assessment, which does not mean that the Supreme 
Court did not deal with these problems. In numerous judgements we find indica-
tions that the expert opinion should be assessed in the light of the requirements of 
modern knowledge, it is necessary to establish whether the expertise is actually 
based on a uniform and commonly accepted research method. It is recommended 
that courts make use of the results of the latest scientific research, as long as these 
results are sufficiently certain and the new method is methodologically flawless.37
Pursuant to the principle of free evaluation of evidence, the adjudicating body 
may accept a given scientific evidence if, based on its knowledge and experience, 
it considers the test method presented by the expert to be reliable and admissible. 
If, on the basis of the Polish criminal process, the jurisprudence did not develop 
something like Daubert’s standard, for obvious reasons dealing with the criteria 
and assessment of the admissibility of scientific evidence in a fragmentary manner, 
then it is necessary to consider whether these criteria and assessments do not result 
directly from the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The science of the 
criminal process distinguishes a priori assessment, consisting in the examination 
of the usefulness of evidence for proving a given issue, which is made in terms of 
the formal admissibility of evidence and the expected substantive importance for 
the case (cf. Article 170 and Article 193 § 1 of the the Code of Criminal Procedure) 
and a posteriori assessment, performed after taking evidence.38
The most controversial in the Daubert standard may arise from the principle 
that we need to know the error rate of a given method and determine its diagnostic 
value.39 It is often practically impossible to calculate such a ratio. There are types of 
tests, especially identification ones, in such departments as dactyloscopy and other 
methods of human identification (cheiloscopy, otoscopy, odontoscopy), where these 
methods are considered reliable and if there are mistakes, it is a human error (result-
ing from carelessness, lack of sufficient training expert and inadequate experience). 
Is there a method error then? After all, the method is efficient and does not assume 
any margin of error. If we assume the efficiency of the method, then how to build 
the quotient of the correct results to the incorrect ones. In that case, the denominator 
would have to be zero – which makes the operation mathematically flawed. There 
is also no criterion for a court judgement. After all, when issuing a conviction, the 
court takes into account all the circumstances and evidence gathered in the case. 
The fact that there was a conviction is only information that the court admitted the 
evidence, but assessed it together with other evidence. However, in some expert 
37 Ekspertyza sądowa. Zagadnienia wybrane, ed. J. Wójcikiewicz, Warszawa 2007, p. 21.
38 Wykład prawa karnego procesowego, ed. P. Kruszyński, Białystok 1998, p. 61; D. Sołodow, 
op. cit., p. 164.
39 Cf. Kryminalistyka, ed. J. Widacki, pp. 178–179.
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opinions (e.g., printing expertise) and investigative activities (e.g., presentation), 
it is possible to use test studies and determine the potential error rate.
Another problem is the criticism of issuing categorical opinions in the opinions 
of experts, which is more and more often found in American literature and trans-
ferred to Poland.40 Mistakes made by careless foreign experts can not depreciate 
recognized and thoroughly tested methods for years. Sometimes we are too fasci-
nated by what is American. Often, after thoroughly studying the presented issues, 
we conclude that the level of research conducted in this field in Poland or in other 
European countries is much higher than the American level. The assessment of 
the given evidence by the trial authority and the judge is also subjective. It is the 
instance of court proceedings that is to protect the citizen against judicial mistakes.
FORENSICS AS A SUBJECT OF DIDACTICS
Forensics as a subject of didactics and a group of scientific and research institutions 
dealing with forensics – these issues are self-evident and do not need to be discussed in 
detail. For the representatives of law enforcement agencies, forensics is a professional, 
compulsory subject, included in the programs of a number of schools and departmental 
universities. A modern lawyer comes into contact with forensics for the first time during 
his studies.41 Although currently every law faculty, as well as university administration, 
has a department or forensics laboratory, the subject of “forensics” is not included in the 
basic subjects. Contemporary legal knowledge passed on to students is so extensive that 
forensics plays the role of a specialized, additional subject, i.e. usually optional. It may 
therefore happen that the future prosecutor, judge, attorney at university will not have 
any contact with forensics at all. Any attempts to discuss in various forums defining 
the curriculum of legal studies usually end up reducing forensics to the rank of police 
science, additional, not necessarily needed by the future lawyer. Unfortunately, such 
a situation causes the widening of the gap between the modern science of forensics, 
which responds to changes in contemporary crime, and the knowledge of a lawyer. 
This situation is not improved by subsequent training within the application, as the 
selection of forensic topics and the level of their conduct is debatable.
Another noteworthy issue is the establishment in Poland of a number of non-po-
lice research units that provide forensic expertise. This gives a chance for greater 
objectivity of experts, which is particularly important in the perspective of changes 
in the code aimed at increasing the adversarial nature of the criminal process 
(especially in the jurisdictional phase).
40 J. Konieczny, op. cit., p. 11 ff. 
41 Cf. B. Hołyst, Kryminalistyka jako przedmiot dydaktyki, “Problemy Kryminalistyki” 1986, 
no. 174, p. 547 ff.
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FORENSICS AS A FORM OF SOCIAL AWARENESS
It might seem that today there is no need to convince anyone that forensics 
functions within the legal sciences42 and is particularly closely related to criminal 
proceedings and substantive criminal law. B. Hołyst describes the problem very 
accurately, who claims that “one of the important factors determining the con-
temporary effectiveness of criminal prosecution and the effectiveness of fulfilling 
the tasks imposed on the judicial institutions is the dissemination of knowledge 
of forensics not only among employees of the police authorities, but also among 
prosecutors, judges and attorneys-at-law. The preparation of a lawyer in the field 
of forensics is fundamental to the protection of the rule of law. Undoubtedly, many 
court errors, discontinuation of proceedings, and acquittal (for lack of evidence, 
despite the fact that everyone knows that the accused is a dangerous criminal) 
could be avoided if prosecutors and judges knew exactly the scientific investigation 
methods. Unfortunately, the level of knowledge of even basic issues in the field of 
scientific investigation methods is still insufficient among lawyers, as evidenced 
by even surprising cases of ignorance”.43 It is understandable that judges, lawyers 
and even prosecutors cannot be required to know exactly the forensic technique. 
However, they should know on a general level the methods of securing evidence, 
be aware of the possibility of conducting individual expert opinions and their pro-
bative value, as well as know at what stage and what elements of material evidence 
should be secured.44 A lawyer unfamiliar with forensics actually “capitulates” in 
front of an expert, often unable to properly assess the evidence significance of 
the tests performed, the value of the methods used and the expert’s qualifications. 
The prosecutor or judge may not be able to carry out an expert opinion, but must 
be aware of the percentage of uncertainty in the research methods used by the 
expert. This uncertainty must be taken into account when assessing the entirety of 
the evidence.45 Knowledge of forensics cannot be reduced only to knowledge in 
the field of forensic technology, although the participation of the prosecutor in the 
inspection of the scene (in the light of recent research and cases) leaves a lot to be 
42 Cf. J. Kasprzak, B. Młodziejowski, W. Brzęk, J. Moszczyński, op. cit., p. 13; E. Gruza, M. Goc, 
J. Moszczyński, Kryminalistyka, czyli o współczesnych metodach…, p. 13.
43 B. Hołyst, Kryminalistyka, Warszawa 2010, p. 43.
44 J. Gurgul, Sprzężenie: biegły – prokurator (policjant), “Problemy Kryminalistyki” 1997, 
no. 216, p. 30 ff.; idem, Wybrane problemy w kontaktach organu procesowego z biegłym, “Problemy 
Kryminalistyki” 2004, no. 244, p. 16 ff.
45 B. Hołyst, Kryminalistyka, Warszawa 2010, p. 43; M. Całkiewicz, Wykorzystanie opinii bie-
głego w polskim procesie karnym, “Problemy Kryminalistyki” 2008, no. 259, p. 26 ff.; eadem, Ocena 
dowodu z opinii biegłego przez organ procesowy w postępowaniu karnym, “Problemy Kryminalistyki” 
2008, no. 260, p. 55 ff.




Jerzy Kasprzak, Magdalena Kasprzak328
desired.46 A lawyer working in law enforcement or the judiciary also undertakes 
a number of tactical activities. It is the forensic knowledge that is necessary for the 
proper questioning of a witness, suspect, confrontation, presentation, search, trial 
experiment or, finally, many reconnaissance and operational activities.47 It is difficult 
to clearly distinguish and list all activities where forensic knowledge is useful or 
even necessary. After all, you can also mention planning the proceeding, creating 
versions, and their checking and verification. In the light of the latest trends, when 
the law enforcement agency, in addition to the classic retroactive action (undertaken 
after the occurrence of a crime), will increasingly proactively (pre-emptively and 
prophylactically) be more and more important in the field of criminal intelligence, 
criminal analysis or profiling.48 So is the problem of knowledge of forensics by 
lawyers a new problem? Well no! This problem has been raised since the times of 
H. Gross49 and unfortunately is still a current problem.
In the 1970s, M. Kulicki already drew attention to the necessity of using fo-
rensics by judges, claiming that in court proceedings forensics has a wide range of 
activities, because personal and material evidence sources are examined, decisions 
are made on the usefulness and reality of the requested measure evidence, con-
frontations are made, inspections are made, experts are appointed and the scope of 
expert opinions is determined, experiments are carried out or the course of events 
is reconstructed. Actions taken by the court in the course of evidence proceedings 
must be properly documented, which also requires forensic preparation. Finally, at 
the stage of adjudication, how often the judge’s ignorance of forensics makes the 
court elude the arguments resulting from painstaking examinations by experts or 
performed activities. Another situation is also possible, when the judge is guided 
only by the authority of the expert or the reputation of the institution conducting 
the research. In the proceedings before the court of second instance, the court 
checks, among other things, the correctness of factual findings and the correctness 
of assessments, and sometimes even supplements the evidence proceedings. And at 
this stage, the principles of forensics play a role and cannot be alien to the judge.50
46 Cf. M. Całkiewicz, Oględziny zwłok i miejsca ich znalezienia, Warszawa 2010. See also 
V. Kwiatkowska-Wójcikiewicz, Oględziny miejsca. Teoria i praktyka, Toruń 2011.
47 Z. Czeczot, T. Tomaszewski, op. cit., p. 24 ff.; Kryminalistyka, ed. J. Widacki, p. 5 ff.
48 J. Konieczny, op. cit., p. 5. Cf. P. Chlebowicz, W. Filipkowski, Analiza kryminalna. Aspekty 
kryminalistyczne i prawnodowodowe, Warszawa 2011; Profilowanie kryminalne, eds. J. Konieczny, 
M. Szostak, Warszawa 2011; J. Gołębiowski, Profilowanie kryminalne, Warszawa 2008.
49 Cf. E. Locard, op. cit., p. 18; J.J. Bossowski, Wiadomości z nauk kryminologicznych, Poznań 
1946, p. 15; P. Horoszowski, op. cit., p. 5.
50 M. Kulicki, Kryminalistyka (zarys wykładu), part 1, Toruń 1972, pp. 18–19. Cf. M. Kulicki, 
V. Kwiatkowska-Wójcikiewicz, L. Stępka, Kryminalistyka. Wybrane zagadnienia teorii i praktyki 
śledczo-sądowej, Toruń 2009. 
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CONCLUSIONS
From the presented discussion it should be assumed that we cannot talk about 
the “twilight” or the end of forensics. There is only a process of changing its iden-
tity and paradigms, and this is perhaps the most violent process in the history of 
this science.
To sum up, the directions of changes in the identity of modern forensics can 
be framed:
− dissemination of forensic knowledge among lawyers,
− extensive introduction of new information technologies supporting inves-
tigative and operational activities (criminal analysis, criminal intelligence, 
profiling, integrated databases),
− striving to obtain the appropriate status of an expert,
− developing new investigative methodologies, especially in the field of or-
ganized, terrorist and computer crime,
− development of research methods for virtual traces,
− continuing research on the possibilities of objectifying the expert’s opinion.
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ABSTRAKT
Współczesna kryminalistyka jest nauką dynamicznie rozwijającą się w ostatnich latach, co 
wiąże się zarówno z ogólnym rozwojem nauki i techniki, jak i z potrzebami wymiaru sprawiedliwo-
ści i organów ścigania. Podstawową cechą kryminalistyki jest jej interdyscyplinarność. Wszystkie 
przedstawione fakty sprawiają, że tożsamość współczesnej kryminalistyki ulega zmianom. Jest 
to poniekąd proces naturalny. Rodzi on jednak wielkie niebezpieczeństwo dezintegracji tej nauki. 
W artykule przedstawiono dyskusję na temat stale zmieniającego się paradygmatu kryminalistyki, jej 
celów i zadań. Tak ważne zagadnienia teoretyczne mają duży wpływ na praktykę kryminalistyczną, 
przede wszystkim na opiniowanie biegłych, nauczanie kryminalistyki i znajomość kryminalistyki 
przez prawników.
Słowa kluczowe: kryminalistyka; interdyscyplinarność; praktyka kryminalistyczna; opiniowanie 
biegłych; nauczanie kryminalistyki
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